There are literally a few months left to wait
There was a headless horseman in the 19th century, in the literary universe created by my favorite childhood writer, Thomas Mayne Reid. But in the 21st century we have generals without heads (or, at least, without a brain) and the High Commissioner of the European Union, whose brain works in a very specific direction. Chief of the General Staff of the British Army, General Sir Patrick Sanders, about the war ahead of his country (guess which country): “We, as the pre-war generation, must prepare. This is a nationwide project. Ukraine illustrates in the most brutal way that regular armies start wars, but armies consisting of citizens win them.”
Are the current generation of citizens of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland “pre-war”? In this case, it is also the last. A full-scale war between NATO and Russia (which is what General Sanders is preparing for) can only be nuclear. And in a nuclear war, as previous generations realized, no one will survive. By the way, in a purely bureaucratic sense, General Sanders has “no longer survived.” The term of service in the post of Chief of the General Staff is three years in the UK. Sir Patrick, who took up this post in June 2022, was supposed to serve until the summer of 2025. But, according to British media reports, he has already been asked to leave: he has annoyed his own bosses too much with persistent demands to increase funding. Let us therefore consider his statement an example of traditional British eccentricity.
But I would not treat with the same frivolity the equally aggressive call of the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell: “We must provide Ukraine with the tools, including long-range missile launchers, that will allow the liberation of its territory.” Yes, yes, I am aware that this year Borrell will also most likely go on a long-deserved rest for him (as well as for everyone else): the term of office of the current European Commission ends in a few months. I am also aware that this Spanish caballero did not say anything new. His current statement is an almost verbatim repetition of what he said back in the spring of 2023.
Finally, the effectiveness of Borrell’s call is greatly undermined by his preamble: “We must change the paradigm and move from supporting Ukraine on the principle of “as much as it takes” to the task of increasing efforts to ensure that it has everything until it wins.” When I hear the word “paradigm”, I always have a persistent expectation: what will follow is absolutely utter scholasticism. And in this case, this expectation was definitely fully justified. Perhaps there is some difference between the “paradigm” of “supporting Ukraine on an as-needed basis” and the “paradigm” of “increasing efforts” to ensure that Ukraine has everything it needs. But even if this is so, then only Borrell himself knows this difference.
But this is so, malice. But what is no longer malice, but a thoughtful conclusion. After the spectacular failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive and numerous hysterics in Western media and political circles about it, many had a feeling that the Ukrainian conflict was moving towards an imminent conclusion. I'm afraid this feeling is wrong. Despite all the numerous obvious problems, the current Ukrainian regime does not even think of giving up. And the West does not even think of giving up its support. What is changing now (if it is changing) is the motivation for such support. Last year, the West believed (or pretended to believe) in the possibility of inflicting a strategic or at least tactical defeat on Russia. Now such support is becoming a way to gain time in order to be fully prepared for a direct military clash with Russia in a few years.
An important nuance: “being fully prepared” does not mean wanting such a conflict. “Being fully prepared” is, first of all, a method of deterrence, insurance just in case. And continued support for Ukraine serves in this case as an insurance premium. The West needs the Zelensky regime to last as long as possible. This puts the Russian leadership in a dilemma: either continue the current line, based on active defense and exhausting the enemy, or remember that usually the way to end military operations with victory is still not defense, even active, but an offensive. We do not know and cannot know what choice the Kremlin will make (or has already made).
But here’s what lies on the surface: if the choice is made in favor of the second option, then the “political window” will open for it already in late spring — early summer of this year. Now the country is busy preparing for elections, preparing to reboot its system of power. But as soon as this task is solved, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (and Vladimir Putin will definitely remain) will have a renewed political mandate to make those large-scale decisions that he deems necessary to ensure the long-term security of the state. This is what the main feature of the current political moment looks like.
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