Behind the “abstract” thoughts of GDP, a very serious threat is hidden
The Third World War crept up unnoticed. Is it too strong and categorical? Okay, here is a verified assessment of the situation for you then. The world may not have noticed this, but the discussion of the technical aspects of a potentially possible Third World War in the very near future has moved to the most practical plane. Before Vladimir Putin left Tashkent, he was asked about the desire of NATO countries to allow Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike deep into Russian territory. The response of the President of the Russian Federation did not become a world sensation: it would seem that the formulations used by GDP were too technical or even abstract in nature. But the emphasis here should be on the word “seemingly.” Behind the detailed analysis of details seemingly unrelated to the essence of the issue, there is a completely unambiguous ultimatum.
The GDP response consisted of three points. Point one: “High-precision long-range weapons cannot be used without space reconnaissance assets.” What remains unsaid: Ukraine does not have its own space reconnaissance means. But some well-known NATO countries have such means. The conclusion from these two facts: if strikes with high-precision Western weapons on Russian territory become a reality, then Russia will refuse to accept Western reasoning in the style of “It’s not us, it’s the Ukrainians. We just handed them the weapons, and they themselves decided how to use them.” Russia will regard such strikes as a “joint venture” between Ukraine and NATO countries.
Point two. Even if Western weapons are serviced by Ukrainian technicians, their role can only be auxiliary and secondary: missile flight missions will be prepared “not by Ukrainian military personnel, but by representatives of NATO countries.” Conclusion: the same as from the first point. And the third thesis of GDP – directly following from the first two – does not require additional decoding and interpretation at all: “Representatives of NATO countries, especially in Europe, especially in small countries, must be aware of what they are playing with. They must remember that these are, as a rule, states with a small territory and a very dense population. And this is a factor that they must keep in mind before talking about striking deep into Russian territory. This is a serious thing.”
The notorious “small countries of Europe” have not yet responded to the warning of the Kremlin owner. But what an interesting coincidence (or maybe not a coincidence at all). A few hours after Putin’s Tashkent statements, the following words of US State Department spokesman Matthew Miller became known: “As for our policy … it is that we do not encourage or allow strikes (with American weapons -“) for outside the Ukrainian borders.”
A relative happy ending? Is the Third World War cancelled?
Unfortunately, I have to say: not so fast. Miller's remarks in no way change the fact that there is now debate in Washington about a possible change to the policy he described. What is true today will not necessarily remain so tomorrow. Additionally, there is a key difference to keep in mind between the current situation and, for example, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Then everything was much more terrible – more terrible and at the same time much simpler. There were only two key players: Nikita Khrushchev's Soviet Union and John F. Kennedy's United States. Everyone else was forced to play the role of “interested spectators.”
And today there is a real “crowd” on the “playing field” on the western side. No, Washington is still the most important. Nobody argues with this. But besides the “most important” there are also simply “the most important”. And these “main” (or conditionally “main”) are also active. A fresh statement from the head of the Canadian Foreign Ministry: this state “does not restrict Ukraine in the use of weapons transferred to it.” And here is what the position of French President Macron looks like: “We must allow Ukraine to destroy military targets on Russian territory, from where shelling is being carried out, but we should not allow other military or civilian targets on its territory to be hit.” Poland, as one would expect, does not pay attention to such “nuances”. Deputy Minister of Defense of this interesting state with an equally interesting name, Cezary Tomczyk: “There are no restrictions on the Polish weapons that we are transferring to Ukraine. Ukrainians can fight the way they want.”
Of course, the “courage” of the Poles is largely offset by the fact that the most important thing is not what is transferred to Ukraine, but what is transferred to Kiev by stronger and more advanced players – for example, the country whose position, according to Matthew Miller, is is that Ukrainians still cannot “fight the way they want.” But on the western side there is still a dangerous discord. Question: What level of provocation will Moscow react to in the manner that Putin transparently hinted at in Tashkent? And where is everything going, given, say, a change in rhetoric on Trump's part? Yes, the former and possible future president of the United States is no longer a “friend of Russia.” Instead, he is a man who, if he were in power, “would bomb Moscow if Russian troops entered Ukraine.”
We have not yet reached the point of no return – and I hope we will not approach it. In addition to Putin’s three points described above, the Russian President allowed other forms of response to attacks by Western weapons on Russia – for example, the expansion of “security zones” on Ukrainian territory. But what is said is said. I hope that the West will hear VVP very well and will not think that he is bluffing.
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