But the Kremlin's strategy in Korea remains largely a mystery
The phrase «historic visit» is so overused that it's even awkward to use. Usually, «historic visits» are forgotten the day after they're over. But Vladimir Putin's current trip to Asia — sorry, Vietnam, but we're talking first and even second about North Korea — will definitely be included, if not in history textbooks, then in many books on contemporary politics.
America is “simply extremely concerned” — such a statement by the US State Department following the results of the GDP’s stay in Pyongyang is perceived in Moscow as the highest possible compliment. Putin has managed to shake up the Western world (or at least that part of the Western world in whose eyes Asia is the center of world politics). But Russia’s strategic goal cannot be to tickle the nerves of the collective West. Russia's strategic goal can only be to promote its own interests. And in this regard, the real results and consequences of the new era of “great friendship” between the Russian Federation and North Korea are still shrouded in fog. Much has already been announced, but the key elements of the political puzzle are still known only to a narrow circle of people.
«They also say that they want to achieve a strategic defeat for Russia on the battlefield. What does this mean for Russia? For Russia, this means the end of its statehood. This means the end of the thousand-year history of the Russian state. And then the question arises: why should we be afraid? Wouldn't it be better to go to the end?» — this piercing statement by Vladimir Putin to Russian journalists before his departure from Vietnam does not raise any particular questions. Russia under Putin's leadership has long since begun the «march to the end.»
After VVP's visits to Pyongyang and Hanoi, his Ukrainian strategy also gained some clarity. From Putin's point of view, Zelensky will cease to be the first person in the current Kyiv regime sometime next year: «The West simply doesn't want to change him now, the time is not right… They will pin all the unpopular decisions on him, including lowering the draft age, and that's it, they will change it later. I think that this will happen sometime in the first half of next year.» After that, according to VVP, Kyiv may well enter into negotiations with Moscow, which it currently rejects.
Everything else follows from this: Putin’s transformation into “the main Ukrainian legalist” and “the main expert on the Ukrainian Constitution”, his thesis that the only legitimate boss in Kyiv is now the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada and his announced strategy of gradual but systematic “squeezing out” enemy from Donbass. I am forced to correct myself somewhat. When discussing long-term plans for GDP, you should never use language like “everything is clear, there can be no more questions.” As a person who comes from the intelligence services, Putin always leaves himself backup options, always hides something up his sleeve. Therefore, I will express myself more carefully: the current statements of the President of the Russian Federation form a single logical chain, a coherent political line that is understandable to external observers.
But nothing similar can be said about the Kremlin’s new line in the Far East. “This treaty is not something new. We concluded this treaty because the old treaty ceased to exist, and in our previous treaty – I think it was in 1962 – everything was the same. There is nothing new here.” – this is how Putin spoke about the significance of the new defense pact between Moscow and Pyongyang. Are you sure that «there is nothing new here», Vladimir Vladimirovich? Old treaties that have lost all their geopolitical and practical meaning are extended — especially with such noise and chic — only when history makes another turn and fills these yellowed documents with new meaning. There is definitely «newness». But what exactly will it result in?
«The Ukrainian regime did not start aggression against Russia, it started aggression against the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics, which we recognized, before they became part of the Russian Federation,» – This is Putin's answer to the unexpectedly arisen main question of the day: will the DPRK's obligations to «mutually repel aggression» extend to the Ukrainian crisis? It seems that the question is closed, especially since the Kremlin boss then added: «Now about somehow using each other's capabilities in this conflict. We are not asking anyone about this, no one has offered this to us, so there is no need.»
I think, however, that the emphasis in my previous sentence should be on “seemingly.” Russia is currently viewing events and its actions anywhere in the world through the prism of the Ukrainian crisis. So the topic is definitely not closed — especially given that Ukraine is now committing aggressive actions against the “old” territory of the Russian Federation. But here’s what else needs to be clearly understood. If Ukraine is of primary importance to Moscow, and Korea is secondary, then for Pyongyang and Seoul it’s the other way around. The leaders in these capitals are viewing relations with Russia and the Ukrainian crisis through the prism of the long-standing conflict on their own peninsula.
This brings to the forefront at least two questions (in fact, there are more, each of these two questions entails dozens of others). The first question is: how far will the now inevitable deterioration in relations between Moscow and South Korea go? This state is one of the most economically significant in the world. And yes, South Korea is an ally of the United States. But until now, this ally has made it clear that in the dispute between Moscow and Washington over Ukraine, it is “sitting on the fence”: trying to satisfy American demands in terms of assistance to Kyiv as little as possible and to maintain economic ties with Russia as much as possible (to the delight of all lovers of Korean mobile phones and other technology).
The new situation has already forced Seoul to rethink its actions. Putin reacted to the new situation as follows: “As for the supply of lethal weapons to the combat zone in Ukraine, this would be a very big mistake. I hope this doesn't happen. If this happens, then we will also make appropriate decisions that are unlikely to please the current leadership of South Korea.” The signal was sent — and, I think, received. But the fact is that “the current leadership of South Korea” definitely does not like Moscow’s decisions that have already been made. Let's see how this situation develops. And it will definitely develop — don’t go to a fortune teller.
Question two: how can Moscow develop its allied relations with Pyongyang without violating the sanctions of the UN Security Council, which it itself allowed to be put into effect at one time? VVP admitted that Russia does not have the legal ability to force the UN to lift these sanctions: “I am aware that in today’s situation it will be almost impossible to do this using conventional methods, but we need to work on it… We intend to start and continue this work . As our people say, water wears away stones.” What people say is correct. But here’s what “the people” don’t know about yet and can’t know: what is Russia’s future “work” to “stitch down” sanctions against the DPRK — if such “stitching down” doesn’t happen, then why does Pyongyang need renewed allied relations with Moscow? — will be combined with its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council? Everything here will also definitely be very interesting — or, better said, “interesting.”
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