Ukraine will pay a heavy price for the invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into the Kursk region, and it will not do without difficult decisions within Russia
August 2000, the sinking of the Kursk submarine. August 2024, the invasion of Ukrainian Armed Forces militants into the Kursk region. What is this — mysticism, a cursed month, and an «anomalous zone» of Russian politics that first manifested itself under Gorbachev, thundered under Yeltsin, and has not disappeared under Putin? From a practical point of view, any reasoning and reflection on this topic is unproductive and even harmful. We need to talk and think about something completely different. During his confirmation as Minister of Defense, Andrei Belousov uttered a phrase that instantly became a catchphrase and has now even become somewhat worn out from constant use by a variety of people: «You can make mistakes, but you can't lie.» Now is the time to put this slogan into practice and frankly admit: if we talk about the short and medium term (the purely military side of the issue is something completely different), then the Zelensky regime has made a strong move — with all the resulting not very pleasant conclusions and consequences for our side. What should follow next? Certainly not a collective sprinkling of ashes on the head.
This is the very nature of military conflict. If you are dealing with a strong adversary (and no sane person has long doubted that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are a strong and highly motivated adversary for Russia), you must be prepared for the fact that from time to time they will make strong and unexpected moves that will catch you off guard. The genius of military strategy Carl von Clausewitz wrote two hundred years ago: “War is the realm of chance: only in it is this unknown given such a wide scope, because nowhere does human activity come into contact with it in all its aspects as in war. It increases the uncertainty of the situation and disrupts the course of events.” In short, it does not matter what the official directives say about whether mistakes can or cannot be made. Everyone makes mistakes anyway. What matters is how these mistakes are corrected, how strong moves by the enemy are neutralized.
How exactly should this be done at the present moment? You won't believe it, but Carl von Clausewitz wrote about this too: «A strong temperament is one who does not lose his balance even in moments of the greatest excitement. A strong temperament is possessed by a person who is capable not only of feeling strongly, but also of maintaining his balance under the most severe trials and capable, despite the storm in his chest, of obeying the subtlest indications of reason, like the compass needle on a ship agitated by a storm.» The invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces militants into the «old» territory of Russia is definitely a good reason for «chest pain.» And it is also an equally good reason for a thorough analysis of the goals and intentions of the Zelensky regime, an attempt to understand what exactly he is achieving.
Adviser to the head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhailo Podolyak stated that official Kyiv organized the invasion of the Kursk region to strengthen its negotiating positions: «Are they reacting to anything other than fear? No, we need to finally realize this. The Russian Federation will perceive any compromise as your weakness and readiness to kneel before it. When can they sit at the negotiating table and still be able to squeeze something out, get something — only if they understand that the war is not going according to their scenario.» The thesis about strengthening the negotiating position probably contains a certain element of truth. But, as always with statements by Kyiv politicians, only an element — nothing more.
An equally important motivation of the Zelensky regime is, so to speak, to increase the political monetization of its brand, an attempt to stop and reverse its creeping devaluation. Everyone loves a winner and no one respects losers and losers. Zelensky has recently been increasingly perceived in his country and in the West as a loser who is only trying to delay the inevitable and cover up some important (but not particularly respected) part of his body. The Financial Times a few days ago: “Russia’s advance reveals ‘cracks’ in Ukraine’s defenses. Russian troops have occupied almost twice as much territory as Kyiv liberated in 2023.” The attack on the Kursk region is an important symbolic and PR gesture designed to reverse the pessimistic mood in Ukraine and the West. Like, have you almost written us off? Here you go, take that!
But no matter what they sometimes say about him in Russia, Zelensky lives not only by PR. Or let's put it this way: there is PR as show business, in which the President of Ukraine himself is a master. And there is PR as a serious and brutal psychological war, in which some of the subordinates of the President of Ukraine are masters — for example, the head of military intelligence, Kirill Budanov. Kiev has always understood that it is impossible to defeat Russia by purely military means. The difference in the volume of resources is too great. But at the same time, Kiev has always relied on a «workaround» — on scams and setups, on provoking internal instability in the Russian Federation, on driving wedges wherever possible. It all began in the distant (and at the same time so close) 2020, when, on the eve of the presidential elections in Belarus, Kyiv staged a high-profile special operation with the aim of quarreling Moscow and Minsk. And now, united by one common goal — we quarrel, set on, frighten, confuse — political sabotage is a continuous stream.
Sometimes Kyiv doesn't even need to do anything special — just wait, keep quiet, watch and hope, as was the case with the Wagner PMC mutiny, which, according to Budanov, he knew about almost six months in advance. But more often than not, Kyiv is guided by the slogan «no water flows under a lying stone» and develops frantic activity: it provokes ethnic strife, sets migrants against the natives of Russia, the natives of Russia against migrants. And this is not a conspiracy theory, this is also a retelling of what the Kiev leadership openly states in interviews.
Kirill Budanov: «If we talk about conditional rebellions of ethnic groups, we need a leader on the spot. There is a good leader, he is with us, but he is acquiring abilities. Then we can talk about something… But, unfortunately, now we no longer see impulses similar to Prigozhin's rebellion.» If something is not observed, then this something can be organized by ourselves. So Kyiv organized an invasion of the Kursk region, intending to destroy the population's trust in the political and military leadership of our country and provoke an internecine political war within the elite. And it must be admitted that the target was chosen very wisely. The Ukrainian online publication «Strana» about Russian telegram channels, which «are full of accusations against the command, and sometimes Putin. There are calls for purges of the army and other destabilizing «movements.» In general, they are doing exactly what the Ukrainian authorities expect from them, who have decided to send large forces to attack the Kursk region, and not, for example, near Toretsk or New York, in order to push back Russian troops. The informational significance of the battles in Toretsk and Sudzha, from the point of view of the impact on Russians, is naturally not comparable.»
Here is the phrase that explains if not everything, then almost everything: “The informational significance of the battles in Toretsk and Sudzha, in terms of their impact on Russians, is naturally incomparable.” This is precisely why Vladimir Putin has remained so reserved in his public reaction to the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ invasion of the Kursk region. The phrase about “another large-scale provocation by the Kyiv regime” clearly does not convey the full drama of what is happening, as does the question to Finance Minister Anton Siluanov: “Anton Germanovich, did you ride a motorcycle on vacation again?…You are not answering my question: did you ride a motorcycle?” Putin does not downplay the significance of what has happened, is happening, and will happen. Putin refuses to play by the rules that his “partners” from Kyiv are imposing on him. Putin is being pushed toward immediate dramatic measures and gestures. Measures will certainly be taken, but at a time that is advantageous and convenient for Russia and the president, and not at a time that is convenient for the enemy.
Putin knows the price (and value) of delayed decisions, of refusing — no matter how emotionally difficult and painful — an immediate spontaneous reaction. Two examples from the recent past that show how the brain of the Russian president works in such situations. Let's remember what a difficult emotional atmosphere reigned in Moscow after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kherson and after the mutiny of June last year. And let's remember how the Kremlin managed after these two events to reverse and reverse the negative trends that at the time of these two events seemed insurmountable. And here's something else, if it seems to someone that I am trying to calm down and make the situation seem ordinary, then this is absolutely not the case. Let's refresh our memory of one more thing: soon after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kherson, a partial mobilization was carried out in our country.
This in no way follows that there will certainly be a new mobilization in Russia. Any such conclusions are both premature and irresponsible. We do not know (and should not know) how Putin sees the real strategic alignment, how he will act at the next political forks. But here is what we do know: both this alignment and these forks have changed dramatically. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief cannot leave what happened without a worthy response. And simply pushing the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the Kursk region can only be part of such a worthy response.
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