The flagship project of the military vehicle of the Ministry of Defense crashed due to strife

To date, the project has only delivered a handful of training vehicles, many of which have caused hearing loss to testers. Credit: Ben Bichall/PA Wire

According to a scathing independent report, Britain's flagship £5bn combat vehicle project was ten years late and not a usable model was delivered due to factional infighting within the Department of Defense.

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Lawyer Clive Sheldon, KC, also said employees tried to hide problems from their bosses at Ajax, which was supposed to deliver the next generation army workhorse, but instead faced setbacks and received complaints about what it called hearing damage and disability in the soldiers who tested it.

< p>MPs have previously called for the scheme to be abandoned, while hundreds of soldiers were to be treated for exposure to intense noise after working on tests.

The Department of Defense has agreed a £5.5 billion contract with the US company General Dynamics for 589 armored vehicles, but so far only a few units have been delivered and they can only be used for training purposes.

In an overview of what went wrong, commissioned by the government, Mr. Sheldon found that “the relationship between various organizations within or associated with the Ministry of Defense were at times fragmented and included the protection of the territory.”

He added: «The review identified a need for a designated person, independent of the chain of command, to whom concerns can be raised and who can 'connect the dots' and provide advice.»

Employees working on the development of the new Ajax vehicle were found to have hidden problems from their superiors. Photo: Julian Simmonds

Mr. Sheldon also found that aspects of the problem-solving rather than sharing culture caused more delays, especially when it came to vibration and noise issues that deafened and injured soldiers testing the vehicle.

He said: “Some people showed a clear desire to solve problems at their level and not disturb overworked executives unless absolutely necessary.

“Part of this was due to the attitudes of those involved and the cultural sense that raising the first plan is a sign of failure.”

It is necessary to develop a «culture of challenge» among those who buy defense. equipment, the report says, calling for different views to be heard.

The 168-page review is the culmination of 70 interviews and tens of thousands of pages of evidence.

James Cartlidge, Secretary of Defense Acquisitions , said: «The resulting report is difficult to read as it highlights a number of systemic, cultural and institutional issues in several areas of the ministry.»

Some close to the program were concerned about these shortcomings and that the army seemed ill-prepared to address them, as a recent incident around which reforms could be made did not occur.

One army officer expressed concern that the Army had not yet experienced the «Haddon Cave moment», referring to the highly critical report by Charles Haddon-Cave QC of the 2006 RAF Nimrod patrol plane crash that killed 14 people.

< p>The officer said: “People raised red flags everywhere, but no one put the picture together. And the Army has yet to experience the Haddon Cave moment. And if it's not from Ajax, I don't know what it will be, but it will be bad. This is a real problem.»

There were no accusations of individuals in the report. It was suggested that consideration be given to improving information sharing and stricter payment terms, as well as a slower turnover of key decision makers, who should remain in place for at least five years during long-term large-scale projects.