How Israel is preventing Hamas from winning

Israeli soldiers work at the entrance to a tunnel on the grounds of Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Photo: Ronen Zvulun/REUTERS

As the sun set on Friday, October 6, Israelis began preparing for Shabbat. For some, their weekend plans weren't particularly relaxing; This will be the fortieth Saturday in a row in which thousands of people will take to the streets of Tel Aviv to protest against the Netanyahu government.

Others had softer intentions. Two hours south of the bustling metropolis, on the sleepy kibbutz of Kfar Aza near the border with the Gaza Strip, Aviv and Livnat Kutz were hoping to spend the next day with their three teenage children and other like-minded locals flying kites near a fence in a sign of peace. . towards its Palestinian neighbors.

At dawn on Saturday there were no rallies or kite flying. As the nation reeled, anti-Netanyahu groups such as Bonot Alternative pivoted their networks to offer emergency support to survivors of the October 7 massacre.

Hamas savages rampaged through quiet kibbutzim along the border, many of them inhabited by Arabic-speaking peace activists who voluntarily carried sick Gazans to Israeli hospitals. Later, in Kfar Aza, the corpses of the murdered Kutz family were found huddled together in the same bed.

The stories of anti-government activists in Tel Aviv and murdered peace activists in the south are revealed in their different ways, two aspects of Israel before October 7, who began to pursue him.

Firstly, political fragmentation. After months of fighting sparked by Benjamin Netanyahu's return on the back of a handful of extremists who immediately tried to destroy democratic traditions, Israel was deeply divided, with tens of thousands of people gathering together every Saturday. Technology companies and investors fled the country and its credit rating fluctuated. That was all everyone was talking about. Families rebelled against families; Abroad, forgotten fanatics made notes.

Second, both security agencies and ordinary citizens have fallen into deep complacency, even somnambulism, regarding the threat from Gaza. After almost ten years without a ground war in the Gaza Strip, everyone believed that the threat of jihad was manageable.

A billion-dollar border fence, studded with sensors and secretive technological innovations, has allowed the full fruits of Israel's technological miracle to impact its security. The Jewish state's fearsome air force and intelligence capabilities provided a powerful deterrent, while the Iron Dome missile defense shield — and even the latest Iron Beam laser system, capable of shooting down missiles — ensured the safety of civilians. Although painful, exacerbations can be managed.

Hamas's arsenal has evolved since Israel's defense system was put into operation — and now poses a real threat Photo: Anas Baba/AFP

Simultaneous with this use of hard power has come Israeli attempts to stabilize society in the Gaza Strip. Tens of thousands of workers from Gaza were allowed to travel to work in the Jewish state each week, bringing much-needed liquidity to the Hamas-run economy.

Israel allowed water, food trucks, suitcases filled with Qatari cash and other resources to cross the border, compensating Hamas for using its own funds to build tunnels; Whatever the boasts, the terrorist group was not going to throw away such stability so easily. The main hope in many quarters was that a political settlement might one day neutralize the threat.

Looking back, one can see the complacency that prevailed in Israel, a regional superpower so formidable that even the Saudis considered a deal to normalize relations. , it was wonderful. Not only remarkable, but also painfully naive.

In the traditional Israeli security picture, Gaza's ragtag militia, armed only with homemade rockets and its own civilian population, was dwarfed by the threat of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran beyond. With Hamas supposedly in the south, Israeli intelligence had its eyes fixed unblinkingly on Tehran, which was on the verge of a nuclear program.

Indeed, as one defense source wryly told me: “If Iran had ordered the attacks, the Mossad would have known about it.” Meanwhile, residents along the Gaza border took Palestinians to hospitals and flew kites as a sign of peace.

These two examples of arrogance—public strife and military complacency—came neatly together in the form of the Band of Brothers movement. This group of military reservists, including elite pilots, refused to serve in protest at the direction in which Netanyahu was taking the country.

After months of infighting caused by the return of Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel was deeply divided, leading to attacks by Hamas. Photo: Anadolu Agency

Their passions were not unfounded. Desperate for power, accused of corruption and operating under a dysfunctional system of proportional representation, the prime minister brought a number of extremists into his coalition to secure his third premiership. The radical reform program they then tried to implement—from abolishing the Supreme Court to proposing prison sentences for immodestly dressed women at the Western Wall—raised howls of indignation throughout Israel, even among those sympathetic to some of the more sensible measures.

Amid real fears for the future of the country's pluralistic democracy, Band of Brothers has abandoned its contribution to Israel's defense. No one thought about Hamas, which watched and sharpened its knives.

Two weeks before the gates of hell swung open, an elite Israeli pilot was interviewed by the Jewish Chronicle. “You used to show up in the middle of the night and they would say they need you to go to Gaza,” he said. “Whatever it is, I would say yes. But now we ask: What kind of war are we talking about?

He would undertake a raid against an existential threat from Hezbollah or Iran, the lieutenant colonel said, but he is hesitant about the mission over Gaza. «I don't think there will be a war tomorrow,» he added.

At 6:30 a.m. on October 7, these misconceptions were dispelled. The pilots soon returned to the skies over the Gaza Strip, and the country regained its solidarity under the leadership of the unity government. Street protests were forgotten. That day marked a turning point in the history of Israel, the region and, to some extent, the world. In the following weeks, every day was October 8th. But it is impossible to get rid of

old tensions forever. This week they found new expression in the tormenting crucible of hostages.

The release of the hostages on Friday deeply touched both the country and the world Photo: Julian Tallis/AFP

Israel has always had a unique approach to the release of captives . An example of this was in 2011, when 1,027 Palestinian prisoners were exchanged for one kidnapped soldier, Gilad Shalit. To the outside world this may seem strange. But the Israeli armed forces are different.

In the shadow of the Holocaust, not only do senior officers put themselves in danger by leading the front, but everyone knows that heaven and earth will be moved to ensure the return of even one soldier, living or dead. This is a great comfort to people like my brother, who volunteered as a combat medic and had no family in the country. This builds a sense of camaraderie and morale, which induces greater courage and combat effectiveness. We are a family. Give your heart and soul to the cause and no one will be left behind. Never again.

Hamas, which uses psychological manipulation as a force multiplier to compensate for its military weakness, has learned to turn Israel's humanity against itself. As the horrific videos that surfaced last month showed, human life has no meaning; terrorists played with severed heads, baked babies, disembowelled women, raped them, gouged out the eyes of corpses and dragged the bodies of old people behind motorcycles.

And, as the widespread use of human shields shows, Hamas no longer cares about the lives of its people. In a viral television monologue two weeks after the massacre, as Israeli bombs fell on the Gaza Strip, leading Egyptian journalist Ibrahim Eissa demanded to know why Hamas had not built «even one bomb shelter» for its civilians while digging terror tunnels under their homes and hospitals. Today, weeks after the ground invasion, the harsh truth is clear to anyone who will hear it: In the war of public opinion, every death is a victory for Hamas.

The jihadist group has captured prisoners in the past. But never on such a scale. Its terrorists swarmed across the border with hostage-taking manuals in their pockets, and as more and more Israeli civilians poured into Gaza, commanders and foot soldiers alike were intoxicated with jubilation. For Hamas, the kidnapped Israelis opened the way to victory.

Speaking on Saudi television after the attacks, the former head of the terrorist organization, Khaled Mashal, said: “The rule we follow is that » />

prisoners are exchanged for prisoners. We took over 1,000 prisoners in exchange for Gilad Shalit. Today we have dozens of soldiers and officers in our hands. Inshallah, we will use them to empty [Israeli] prisons.”

They would also be used, Hamas hoped, to deter, delay and ultimately halt Israel's response, allowing the terrorist group to repeat the massacre. Hamas leader Ghazi Hamad stated this directly on Lebanese television. “The Al Aqsa flood is just the first case, and there will be a second, a third and a fourth because we have the resolve, determination and capacity to fight,” he said.

When asked if his goal was the destruction of Israel, he replied: “Yes, of course. We must remove this country.» Reflecting an extraordinary echo of the cult of victimhood prevalent in the West, he added: “We are victims of occupation. Full stop. Therefore, no one should blame us for what we do. October 7, October 10, a million October, everything we do is justified.” The fact that Gaza had not been “occupied” since 2005 made no difference.

But Hamas developed its plans for victory based on the old status quo. In his basic analysis, it was correct that while his own side fetishized death (terrorists were filmed lying in their own graves to quell any remaining hesitation), the Israelis were obsessed with life. But using Israel's humanity against itself will not work this time. His calculation was wrong: if 1,027 prisoners had been exchanged for one hostage in the past, then 240 hostages would have yielded 246,480 Palestinians. It was also wrong to assume that fighting would cease for an extended period in the meantime, allowing her to fight another day.

What Hamas has always lost sight of is the fact that Israel is not a colonial power like France, whose occupation of Algeria ended in death by a thousand cuts. The Israelis have no other country to go to. The alchemy of Israeli society, whose culture of conscription creates deep bonds of social responsibility and national pride, is such that increasing societal agony provokes an equal and opposite response of solidarity and firmness.

The Jewish state is determined to defeat the enemy at any cost.

The Jewish state is determined to defeat the enemy at any cost.

The Jewish state is determined to defeat the enemy at any cost.

The Jewish state is determined to defeat the enemy at any cost.

The Jewish state is determined to defeat the enemy at any cost.

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On the Israeli side, everything changed on October 7th. By killing innocents with such brutality and taking so many hostages, including infants and Holocaust survivors, Hamas inadvertently changed the security calculus. The policy of containment, which had been the main pillar of Israeli defense policy for decades, was destroyed.

For years, everyone knew that Hamas had both the ability and the intent to cause serious harm to Israelis. . The group did not hide either: Jerusalem knew about the tunnels and the spirit of genocide, but believed that the threat was under control.

Since October 7, one stark new lesson has eclipsed all others: If your enemy has the ability and the motivation, sooner or later he will act. As a result of the spectacular success, Hamas signed its own death warrant.

If the hostages were part of Hamas' path to victory, Jerusalem refused to join them on that path. Gone are the days when Yahya «The Butcher of Khan Yunis» Sinwar — a convicted terrorist who underwent life-saving surgery in an Israeli prison — was released in a prisoner exchange only to repay Israel by orchestrating the atrocities of October 7, 12 years later.

If the hostages were part of Hamas's path to victory, Israel refused to join them about it . Photo: Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images Europe

Days after the attacks, as the public rallied behind him, Netanyahu announced Israel's military objectives. They were twofold — return the hostages and destroy Hamas. The exclusion of these two purposes was intended to unify the natural doves and hawks, and, first, no conflict was recognized between these purposes. Some commentators feared that the defeat of Gaza would scatter the hostage takers and make it impossible to gather intelligence on their whereabouts; everyone was worried that the prisoners might be harmed by Israeli bombs.

But Hamas had to be destroyed. The new concept that only military pressure would lead to the release of hostages received widespread support. Of course, more Israelis will die, but the terrorist threat must be defeated. Guided by this approach, Israel went to war.

Fast forward a few weeks, however, and the political divisions that plagued Israel before October 7 have begun to creep back under the door. Opinion polls have reflected the extent to which Israel's old rivalries are now being refracted through the hostage debate: 22% of Israelis believe there should be no negotiations with Hamas, according to data from the Israel Democracy Institute released earlier this month.

Meanwhile, support for hostage negotiations and a pause in fighting rose from 17% in mid-October to 22% in November. However, when voting intentions were taken into account, the differences were stark: 49% of Netanyahu's supporters were against the deal, while among his opponents, 76% were for it.

In a sign of rising political tensions this week, Itamar Ben- Gvir, the outspoken national security minister who ranks high among the government's far-right extremists, took part in an undignified altercation with the families of prisoners during a parliamentary committee meeting. session. After the exchange was approved, he called it a «disaster» and accused Israel's leaders of «idiocy.» These tensions were reflected in an alleged split within the War Cabinet.

Netanyahu and his right-wing Defense Minister Yoav Gallant are said to favor a relentless military offensive, while centrists Benny Gantz and Gabi Eisenkot preferred a ceasefire in exchange for hostages. When Eisenkot met with the families of the abductees last week, it was sensationally reported that he admitted that the release of their relatives was a higher priority than the destruction of Hamas.

For many Israelis, a four-day ceasefire is seen as a heavy price to pay. They understand that this will put their soldiers — husbands, brothers, sons — not only at a tactical disadvantage, but also in a dangerous situation.

As Danny Danon, a leading Likud figure and political rival of Netanyahu, told me this week: “The deal puts our soldiers in Gaza at risk by allowing Hamas to resupply, photograph our forces and plan future attacks. Not only will we have tens of thousands of troops in hostile territory who will not be allowed to move or shoot, they will be vulnerable to ambush.»

Moreover, the flow of fuel and other aid into the sector will inevitably be stopped and used by Hamas, replenishing its fighters and fueling its network of tunnels. Nevertheless, Israel's desire to save its civilian population prevailed. His old spirit was not completely forgotten.

During the 2014 Gaza war, infantry officer Hadar Goldin was killed in a Hamas ambush just hours after a UN-brokered ceasefire went into effect. Then Danon, then deputy defense minister, was fired after opposing Netanyahu's decision to stop the war without finishing off Hamas. The Prime Minister believed that this would cost the lives of 400 soldiers, and believed that this was too high a price.

Unfortunately, nine years later, this judgment looks naive. “I still believe that continuing the offensive in 2014 would be the right approach,” Danon told me. “We should not have succumbed to international pressure. We had to finish the job.»

These concerns are reflected among the general public. An old school friend of mine who now lives in Jerusalem said, “I can send my son to risk his life fighting for our people. But I cannot send him to throw away his life on a political whim… If Bibi had even the slightest intention (to destroy Hamas), he would not agree to a ceasefire that undoes all the work our soldiers have done to achieve this. period.»

The release of the hostages on Friday, as elderly women and children raced across the border in jeeps as Red Cross flags fluttered and cheered, deeply touched both the country and the world. But the scenes were haunted by concerns that they signaled a breakdown in Netanyahu's resolve, which would lead to reconciliation with Hamas rather than its destruction. Not only will this lead to further terrorist atrocities and hostage crises in the future, but it will also worsen Israel's deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis its more formidable rivals to the north.

In recent weeks, anti-government activists have found their voices again, returning to streets to support the captives' families and put political pressure on the Netanyahu government.

The call for the release of hostages is, of course, deeply humanitarian, but Hamas wants to weaponize the movement, refusing, for example, to release all members of one family in order to preserve the pain and tighten the screws in Jerusalem. The current deal may have bought the Prime Minister some time, but time has a way of running out. If the old divisions return to Israeli politics, the old security complacency risks creeping in with it.

Anti-government activists have regained their voice, putting political pressure on the Netanyahu government. Photo: Ahmad Gharabli/AFP

This has implications for the future of Israel. Gulf states are closely monitoring developments. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain joined the Abraham Accords because they saw Israel as the economic, technological and security hub of the region. These advantages were so compelling that before October 7, Saudi Arabia was also considering taking the plunge; this may be one explanation for the timing of the Hamas attack. If Israel shows itself to be a paper tiger, such alliances will be ruled out, leaving the Jewish state once again isolated in the region.

This is where the international community comes into play. To begin with, the leaders of democratic countries united around the Jewish state, which was clearly subjected to unprovoked aggression. But they faced growing protests in their capitals as uninformed Western liberals reacted to images of Palestinian suffering by jumping to the easy conclusion and joining the Islamists in the streets.

Before our eyes, natural compassion for the suffering of innocent people is turning into a powerful a political force that reeks of Israelphobia.

Hamas sometimes seems to enjoy more support in Western cities than in the Arab world and even in the Gaza Strip itself. On Wednesday, an old Palestinian colleague called me from the hospital grounds in Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip. Hamas faced a wave of pent-up anger from its own people, he admitted in hushed tones.

There is no such anger in London. Or even in Paris. Emmanuel Macron was the first to break the consensus and call on Israel to stop defending itself, but time is ticking until others follow.

As time passes and images of Gaza's suffering become ubiquitous, reasonable arguments for a just war come under unbearable strain. Indeed, one of the main reasons the Netanyahu government agreed to the hostage deal in the first place was because it was in the White House; with his two carrier strike groups in the Eastern Mediterranean, Joe Biden spoke loudly in his favor.

This is pushing Israel to the brink. The slow return of division and complacency within the country, coupled with growing international pressure, is undermining its ability to defend itself. If we are to restore effective deterrence, Hamas must be destroyed unconditionally. However costly it may be in terms of blood, money and international prestige, Hamas is Israel's lesser enemy.

The main lesson of October 7, which was well learned in the early weeks, but some of its gains have since been lost It is obvious that Israel can no longer live in a world in which there are genocidal enemies. Sooner or later there will be a reckoning, and from now on it must happen on Israel's terms.

The logical conclusion is that Israel must destroy both Hezbollah and Iran. He probably has the military power to do this. But pressure from the international community and activists within the Jewish state itself conspire to prevent the country from acting in its own interests.

Jake Wallis Simons is editor of the Jewish Chronicle and author of Israelophobia: The Newest Version. ancient hatred and what to do about it