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Политика

Professor Zhdanov explained Europe's panic in front of Russia: “Feel the difference”

An expert comprehends the results of the Munich Conference

European politicians are in confusion, close to panic — for the first time the Munich Security Conference has come down to a discussion of whether or not to exist NATO. The cessation of American financing of the Kyiv regime and the hint of the US withdrawal from the Euro-Atlantic bloc raised a sacramental question for Europeans: how to live further? What Europeans are preparing for, said Doctor of Law, Honored Lawyer of Russia, Professor Yuri Zhdanov.

An expert reflects on the results of the Munich Conference

— Yuri Nikolaevich, what’s the commotion about? Congress did not allocate the next tranche to Ukraine? So this may be temporary. Maybe they’ll also gild Kyiv’s pen. Did Trump say something about the insolvency of alliance members? So he is not yet president and it is not yet known whether he will become one. And if he does, he can change his position many times, like any real gentleman, the owner of his word: he wanted it — he gave it, he changed his mind — he took it back. Is it worth sounding the alarm prematurely?

– In Europe they saw alarming signs for themselves. Indeed, it is very difficult to call the event of February 16–18 in Munich a security conference, comparing this event with similar ones that have been taking place for more than 60 years. Rather, it looked like a meeting of the anti-crisis headquarters.

As observers from the Western media note, “less than an hour into the Munich Security Conference, the conversation turned from the proposed agenda to the question of whether the US Congress could find a way to fund new weapons for Ukraine, and if so, how long for the Ukrainians will be able to hold out. And while Donald Trump's name was rarely mentioned, the prospect of whether he would follow through on his threats to leave NATO and allow Russia to «do whatever they want» with allies he deemed insufficiently solvent hung over much of the dialogue.

True, they tried to maintain an optimistic note at the forum. Thus, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg concluded three days of negotiations at the Munich Security Conference on Sunday 18 February 2024, emphasizing that the world has become more dangerous, but NATO has become stronger. And the day before, on February 17, speaking alongside US Senator Pete Ricketts and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, Stoltenberg said that the alliance never takes peace for granted, but that there was no immediate military threat to any of the NATO allies. At the same time, the Secretary General pointed to the record growth in defense spending and the production of allied weapons as an example of how the Alliance is adapting to a more dangerous world.

– Outwardly, everything looks quite decent. How were the claims against the Americans filed?

– Also – decently. Stoltenberg welcomed the increase in aid to Kyiv from European allies and Canada, and tactfully reminded that there is a “vital and urgent need” for the United States to follow suit.

And in talks with two bipartisan U.S. Senate delegations, Stoltenberg stressed that a strong NATO is in the U.S. national interest and emphasized the urgent need for U.S. approval of further assistance to Ukraine. He said support for Ukraine was an example of true transatlantic burden-sharing, and welcomed the allies' historic increase in defense spending.

– How did U.S. officials react?

— Expectedly — evasive. US Vice President Kamala Harris tried to reassure nervous Ukrainians and Europeans with assurances of her administration's determination to help Kiev.

When she flew to Germany last year for the Munich Security Conference, she made an unequivocal promise: “The United States will continue to support Ukraine and we will do so as long as necessary.”

This time Harris’ message sounded almost similar.

– Almost?

– The New York Times caught an important nuance in its recent publication: “You have made it clear that Europe will support Ukraine,” Harris said, “and I will make that clear to President Joe Biden, and I will support Ukraine.”

Feel the difference? Not the USA, but she, Harris, and Biden. As The New York Times emphasizes, “It was a personal promise she could make on behalf of herself and her president, but she could not be so categorical about her country. For those looking for clues, it was a seemingly minor change in wording that spoke volumes.»

Hence the alarming sentiments of Europeans: according to the publication, neither Biden nor Harris can no longer promise with any degree of confidence that America will really provide long-term assistance to Ukraine. House Republicans are blocking $60 billion in aid. And elections in less than nine months could return to power former President Donald Trump, who is no friend of Ukraine or NATO.

Zelensky expressed general concern at a joint press conference with Harris: “The key issue for us now is maintaining fundamental American support.”

Harris assured that in both houses of Congress there is still a bipartisan majority in favor of assistance Ukraine, even though House Republicans are blocking the vote. If the bill reaches the House of Representatives, she has no doubt that it will be passed, as it already was in the Senate.

Kamala Harris made it clear that she would not entertain the idea that the administration might need a Plan B: “There is only a Plan A, which is designed to ensure that Ukraine gets what it needs.”

But, writes the New York Times, “few at the Munich conference had more confidence in Plan A. The Europeans, who had just passed their own aid package, listened to American guarantees for months only to discover that, in the end, , nothing of the kind is guaranteed.”

– And then Trump’s words sounded so inappropriate. How seriously were they taken in Europe?

– Seriously. Western media are repeating Trump's words «about encouraging Russia to attack NATO allies who are not paying their fair share.»

In Munich, all European conference participants had the main question in their minds: if Trump becomes president of the United States again, what will happen to Europe and NATO? Observers say that in Munich, “the specter of Trump and Trumpism” loomed over panels on the conflict in Ukraine and European Union politics, and “dominated the behind-the-scenes chatter like never before.”

The Economist in the article “Can can Europe defend itself without America? tried to highlight the sharpest edges of this issue:

“For leaders gathered at the Munich Security Conference, the annual meeting of defense and security bigwigs, in an ominous development for the continent, on February 17 the Ukrainian army, starved of American ammunition due to the failure of the US Congress to pass an additional aid bill, was forced to leave the eastern city of Avdeevka.

The impasse in Congress reflects the malign influence of Donald Trump, whose fierce opposition to Ukraine aid has forced Republicans into submission. But the specter of Trump's return to power in the November presidential election has cast an even greater shadow over Munich. A week earlier, Trump boasted that he had told an ally he would not come to their defense if they failed to meet NATO spending targets: “Are you insolvent? No, I wouldn't defend you. In fact, I would advise them to do whatever the hell they want.”

Russia's rearmament, Ukraine's worsening fortunes and Trump's eventual return to the White House have brought Europe to its most dangerous moment in decades. European states and armies are asking whether they should overcome this crisis without their ally of nearly 80 years.”

– Even so, should they?

– The inertia of thinking is too great, the habit of having someone do and decide everything for you. But, apparently, the time has come to prepare for an independent life. According to experts, the question is not only whether America will abandon Ukraine, but also whether it can abandon Europe. For Europe to fill the space left by America's absence, it will need to do much more than just increase defense spending. We will have to reconsider the nature of military power, the role of nuclear deterrence in European security and the far-reaching political consequences of military structural reorganization.

– So, are Europeans ready for such a life?

– At least, they demonstrate such readiness. Thus, on February 17, Czech President Petr Pavel said that his country had “found” 800,000 shells that could be sent to Ukraine within a few weeks.

And Boris Pistorius, Germany's defense minister, insisted in an interview with The Economist that European arms production was growing «as quickly as possible» and said he was «very optimistic» that Europe could plug America's gaps.< /p>

Again, Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, said on February 17: “We have to stop moaning, whining and grumbling about Trump. We must work with those who are on the dance floor.»

But not everyone is so optimistic. If American aid disappears entirely, Ukraine will likely lose, one American official admitted to The Economist. Pistorius is right that European weapons production is growing rapidly: “By the end of 2024, the continent should be able to produce 1-2 million tons of ammunition annually, potentially overtaking America. But this may come too late for Ukraine, which needs about $1.5 million a year, according to Rheinmetall, a European arms manufacturer. And the sense of wartime urgency is still missing. European manufacturers export 40% of their ammunition production to non-EU countries, with the exception of Ukraine. When the European Commission proposed making Ukraine a legal priority, member states refused. The continent's arms companies complain that their order books remain too meager to warrant large investments in production lines.”

– It is clear that there is no real desire to arm Ukraine for free. But the “Russian threat” is probably in the foreground?

— Undoubtedly. According to Admiral Rob Bauer, head of NATO's international military committee, “Allies disagree on how long it will take Russia to restore its strength to pre-war levels, and the timing will depend on Western sanctions. Three to seven years is the range that many people talk about.”

Estonia's annual intelligence report, published on February 13, is telling: «We can expect NATO to face a massive Soviet-style army within the next decade.» And the Danish Minister of Defense bluntly stated: “It cannot be ruled out that within three to five years Russia will put Article 5 and NATO solidarity to the test.” Some representatives of European intelligence consider this alarmist.

Let me remind you that Russian President Vladimir Putin, in an interview with American journalist Tucker Carlson, explained in detail that Moscow is not going to attack NATO countries. He stressed that Moscow is ready for dialogue.

However, experts admit that Europe’s biggest fear is to confront Russia alone.

– But such “fears” have already visited Europe…

— Yes it was. The idea of ​​European «strategic autonomy», once promoted only by France, has been supported by other countries. Defense spending, which began to rise after the events in Ukraine in 2014, has now increased sharply. That year, only three NATO allies met the target of spending 2% of GDP on defense, which was set at least at last year's Vilnius summit. This year, at least 18 states, 62% of European allies, will act on it. Europe's total defense spending will reach approximately $380 billion, roughly the same as Russia's, adjusted for purchasing power parity. However, Europe's defense spending produces disproportionately little combat power. At last year's summit, NATO leaders approved their first comprehensive national defense plans since the Cold War. Alliance officials now say these plans would require increasing Europe's existing (and unmet) military capability goals by about a third. This would mean about 50% more defense spending than today, raising the total to 3% of GDP. Only America, Poland and Greece today reach this level.

But the problem is not only about money, but also about people. A recent report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank, found that the number of combat-ready battalions has increased little since 2015 (France and Germany added just one) or even decreased (in the UK, by five). At last year's conference, an American general complained that most European countries could field only one full-fledged brigade (a formation of several thousand troops). For example, Germany's «bold» decision to send a full brigade to Lithuania would likely seriously weaken its army.

Even when Europe can build a fighting force, it often lacks what it needs to fight effectively and lastingly: trained personnel. Military expert Michael Kofman lists what the Europeans lack: command and control capabilities, such as staff officers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, such as drones and satellites, and logistics capabilities, including airlift. Even enough ammunition to last a week or so. “What European militaries can do, they can do very well,” sums up Michael Kofman, “but they usually can’t do it for very long, and they are set up for the initial period of a war that the United States will fight.”

Another defense analyst, Konrad Muzyka, gives the example of Poland: “It will spend 4% of its GDP on defense this year and will spend more than half of that money on equipment, well above the NATO target of 20%. It purchases a huge number of tanks, helicopters, howitzers and Himars rocket artillery. At first glance, this is exactly what Europe needs. But under the previous government, this was done without clear planning and with complete disregard for how to complete and maintain this equipment, and the number of personnel was reduced. Polish Himars launchers can fire at ranges of up to 300 km, but the country's own reconnaissance platforms cannot see targets at such a distance. In this matter they will rely on America.”

— What proposals were made?

Yuri Zhdanov: One option would be, according to military analysts at The Economist, “for Europeans to pool their resources. For example, over the past 16 years, a group of 12 European countries have jointly purchased and operated a fleet of three long-range cargo aircraft—essentially a timeshare program for air cargo. In January, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain agreed to jointly purchase 1,000 missiles used in the Patriot air defense system, using bulk supplies to reduce costs. The same approach could be applied to other areas, such as reconnaissance satellites. The difficulty lies in the division of the spoils.”

– What kind of spoils?

– We are talking about military orders. The Economist writes: “Countries with large defense industries — France, Germany, Italy and Spain — often cannot agree on how contracts should be distributed among national arms manufacturers. There is also a trade-off between quickly plugging the holes and building the continent's own defense industry. France is irritated by a recent German-led scheme, the European Sky Shield Initiative, in which 21 European countries are jointly purchasing air defense systems, in part because it involves buying American and Israeli launchers alongside German ones. When Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, recently called for Europe to embrace a “war economy,” Benjamin Haddad, a French lawmaker for Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance party, retorted: “We will not achieve this by buying American equipment.” European arms manufacturers, he argued, would hardly hire workers and build new production lines if they did not receive orders.”

– That is, competition, even against the backdrop of a common threat, was not canceled?< /p>

— Who will cancel it? Jan Joel Andersson of the EU Institute for Security Studies argues in a recent article that the European defense industry is less fragmented than many assume: “The continent produces fewer types of fighter and radar aircraft than, for example, America. Countries often have different priorities. France needs carrier-based aircraft and lighter armored vehicles. Germany prefers longer-range interceptors and heavier tanks. Pan-European tank cooperation has consistently failed, and the ongoing Franco-German effort is in doubt.»

Moreover, the scale of the changes Europe requires raises broader economic, social and political questions. According to Pistorius, Germany's military renaissance will not be possible without cutting other government spending or abandoning the country's «debt brake», which will require constitutional changes.

— Constitutional?

— Pistorius says he is convinced the German public supports increased defense spending, but admits that «we have to convince people that this could have an impact on other spending.» Thierry Breton, the EU commissioner in charge of defense, has proposed creating a 100 billion euro ($108 billion) defense fund to boost production. Kaja Kallas, the Prime Minister of Estonia, backed by Macron and other leaders, has proposed that the EU finance such defense spending through joint borrowing, as it did with the recovery fund it created during the Covid-19 pandemic, which remains controversial for some members of the Union.

Again, when it comes to building up the military industry, the shortage of labor in Europe raises serious discussions.

– And this is against the backdrop of a colossal influx of migrants?

“So these are not labor migrants, but parasites; you can’t put them on the machines, much less under arms.” In December, Pistorius said that «in hindsight» Germany had made a mistake by abolishing compulsory national service in 2011. And in January, General Sir Patrick Sanders, head of the British army, said preparing Western societies for martial law would be “a whole national enterprise.” His remarks sparked a national furore over conscription, although he never used the word. And now several Western European countries are studying models of “total defense” of Sweden, Finland and other Northern European countries.

– How will the problem of the “nuclear umbrella” be solved?

– This is the most painful question. During Trump's first term in office, old debates about how Europe can compensate for the loss of the American umbrella have been revived. Great Britain and France also have nuclear weapons. But they have only 500 warheads, compared to America's 5,000 and Russia's nearly 6,000. For proponents of “minimal” deterrence, this does not matter much: they believe that a few hundred warheads, more than enough to wipe out Moscow and other cities, will force Russia to abandon any “reckless adventure.” Darker analysts believe that this lopsided megatonnage and the disproportionate damage suffered by Britain and France gives Russia an advantage.

According to Western experts, this is not just a numerical problem. Britain's nuclear weapons have already been transferred to NATO, whose Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) sets policy on how nuclear weapons should be used. The following arguments are given. Yes, the deterrent is operationally independent — the UK can launch a missile whenever it wishes. But it depends on America to develop its future warhead and relies on the country's shared pool of missiles stored in Georgia. According to a bipartisan assessment published a decade ago, if the US were to end all cooperation, Britain's nuclear forces «would probably have a lifespan measured in months rather than years.» In contrast, France's deterrent is entirely internal, but more distant from NATO — France remains the only ally among the alliance members not participating in the NPG. Although she has long stated that her arsenal “by its very existence” contributes to the security of the bloc.

The question now is how Britain and France can fill the gap if America leaves. Christian Lindner, German finance minister and head of the Free Democratic Party, proposed in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on February 13 to “rethink” the European nuclear agreement: “Under what political and financial conditions will Paris and London be willing to maintain or expand their own strategic collective security capabilities? And vice versa, what contribution are we ready to make?

— What have we come to?

– French expert Bruno Tertre believes that the idea that Great Britain or France will “share” the decision to use nuclear weapons is doomed to failure. France is unlikely to join the NPG or transfer its air-launched nuclear forces to NATO, he said. But one option would be for both countries to more forcefully reaffirm that their deterrents will, or at least can, cover their allies. In 2020, Macron said France's «vital interests» — issues on which it would consider using nuclear weapons — «now have a European dimension» and proposed a «strategic dialogue» with allies on the topic, a position he reaffirmed last year.

The question is how to make it believable. The critical issue in deterrence, he says, is how to make adversaries—and allies—believe the commitment is real, rather than a cheap diplomatic gesture that can be abandoned when the stakes become apocalyptic. Tertre offers a number of options. After all, France could simply promise to consult with its partners on the use of nuclear weapons, time permitting. More radically, if the American umbrella were to disappear entirely, France could invite European partners to participate in nuclear operations, such as providing bomber escort aircraft, joining a task force with a possible successor to the USS Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier that could host nuclear weapons, or even the deployment of several missiles in Germany. Such options may ultimately require a “common nuclear planning mechanism,” he said. By the way, Poland demanded to be included in agreements on the joint use of nuclear weapons…

The Economist writes that the nuclear issue, which involves deepest questions of sovereignty, identity and national survival, points to the vacuum that will be left if America leaves Europe. The publication recalls the words of François Mitterrand, the former President of France, said back in 1994: “A European nuclear doctrine, a European deterrent, will appear only when there are vital European interests that Europeans consider as such and others understand them as such. We are far from that.»

Today Europe is closer, but perhaps not close enough, says The Economist: «The same doubt that prompted France to build its own nuclear force in the 1950s (will sacrifice is the American president New York for the sake of Paris?), is repeated in Europe: will Macron risk Toulouse for the sake of Tallinn? Will there be priority for EU members?

– It is expected that many copies will be broken on this issue, if at all it will not become a bone of contention. Daniel Fiott of the Royal Elcano Institute, a Spanish think tank, says the EU-only option won't work. This is partly because the EU's own military headquarters is still small, inexperienced and unable to control high-intensity warfare. Partly because it would exclude the UK, which spends the most money on defense in Europe. As well as other current non-EU NATO members such as Canada, Norway and Turkey. The alternative would be for the Europeans to inherit fragments of NATO structures and maintain the alliance without America. Whatever institution is chosen, it must be staffed with qualified officers.

Olivier Schmitt, a professor at the Center for Military Studies in Denmark, believes that among Europeans only «the French, the British and maybe the Germans on a good day can send officers capable of planning operations at the division and corps level.»

– But competent officers can be trained…

– I agree, the issue of command is inherently political. Fiott doubts that EU member states will be able to agree on a figure equivalent to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the alliance's top general and, by tradition, always an American. This epitomizes how American dominance in Europe has suppressed intra-European disputes for decades. This is even reflected in the Cold War adage that NATO's goal is to keep «the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.» Sophia Besh of the Carnegie Endowment (banned in the Russian Federation) quips that Europeans continue to defer to America on critical issues of European security. She sees little hope that Europe will bring bold new ideas to the July NATO summit in Washington, which will mark the alliance's 75th anniversary.

There is currently an intense debate about how best Europe should hedge against an American exit. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned on February 14 that the idea was futile: “The European Union cannot protect Europe. Eighty percent of NATO's defense spending comes from non-EU NATO allies.»

Proponents of European self-sufficiency counter that creating a “European pillar” within NATO serves a triple purpose. It strengthens NATO as long as America remains, shows that Europe is willing to share the burden of collective defense, and, if necessary, lays the groundwork for a future rupture. Higher defense spending, increased weapons production, and more combat-ready forces will be required even if the United States remains in the alliance and follows current military plans. Moreover, even the most ardent Europhile presidents may be forced to divert forces away from Europe if, for example, America becomes embroiled in a major war in Asia.

Fiott believes difficult issues surrounding command and control and its implications for political leadership are likely to remain for a long time. The worst case scenario of a complete US withdrawal from NATO would require a “messy” solution, perhaps one that would bring overlapping European institutions into greater alignment. He proposes some radical options, such as giving the EU itself a seat in the North Atlantic Council, NATO's main decision-making body, or even merging the posts of NATO secretary general and president of the European Commission.

– Is this why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz blocked the nomination of Ursula von der Leyen to the post of NATO Secretary General?

– Scholz said “nicht” to Frau for many reasons, including internal political ones. But this is their problem. However, the official version is that it is too aggressive towards Russia.

– Well, Scholz doesn’t favor us either, he supplies Ukraine with weapons more than others.

– Here, as our liberals say, other. Scholz also fears that von der Leyen could, on the one hand, provoke a war with Russia at a very inopportune moment. And, on the other hand, cause irreparable damage to the combat potential of the alliance. Many in Germany believe that during her time as German Defense Minister, she brought the Bundeswehr to an almost complete loss of combat capability.

By the way, the former head of the Munich Conference Horst Teltschik called on Western states to realize the need to start negotiations with Russia: “Collective West wants to prevent Russia from winning. I think this is crazy. We don't need war, we need negotiations.»

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