Standing under the saffron, white and green tricolor on the ledges of the Red Fort in New Delhi during Indian Independence Day celebrations. month, Narendra Modi repeatedly pointed his prototypical index finger at the sultry sky, heralding a new dawn.
“Just as a new world order took shape after the Second World War, I clearly see… a new geopolitical equation is rapidly progressing in the wake of the Covid pandemic.” , he said.
India's prime minister is half hoping, half betting that demographic trends, a partial retreat from globalization and a collective international desire to contain the rise of China are causing the old East-West rift to disintegrate into a patchwork of alliances, leaving countries with so-called » Global South» has a greater impact on what comes next.
Items on their wish list include restructuring the UN Security Council so that it represents the world as it is today, not as it was in end of World War II, addressing similar power imbalances in the Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. and challenge the omnipotence of the US dollar.
Such discussions to date have focused more on listing the shortcomings of existing power structures, rather than on developing specific proposals for what could replace them. Modi has worked hard to ensure that his country, which just overtook China as the world's most populous country, will become a key player in future shenanigans. However, there are signs that India's strong aversion to being drawn into any particular camp will be tested as a kaleidoscope of global diplomacy.
For the West, these shifts will mean learning to deal with countries that are not and never will be full-paying subscribers to the Washington Consensus, and developing alliances based on mutual interests rather than shared values. India — China's rival, Russia's friend, a model of conscious ambivalence towards the West (and Great Britain in particular) — looks set to become the defining test case.
Throughout the hot, humid summer, parts of the Indian capital that Modi derides as “Lutens Delhi” have undergone extensive spring cleaning. Legions of workers are replacing missing paving stones, planting shrubs, polishing sculptures and pruning the trees that line the wide avenues.
Named after Sir Edwin Lutyens, the English architect who designed many colonial (now government) buildings, «Lutens Delhi» became something of a pejorative shorthand for the traditional nexus of the establishment elite that Modi, the son of a railway worker, Wallach, achieved enormous electoral success by speaking against. But now the old place is being spruced up ahead of a highly publicized visit by world leaders and diplomatic panjandras from the world's largest G20 economies.
Street dogs are even caught and released. on the far outskirts of a huge metropolis with a population of 33 million people. One young Delhi resident joked that this frantic activity was reminiscent of the hurried efforts of a young man quickly pushing a vacuum cleaner around his apartment and pushing dirty clothes under the bed before a new girlfriend's first visit.
Modi has certainly invested enormous personal capital in the summit. It seems like almost every flat surface is covered with either his image, the G20 logo, or both. There are even G20 stickers on the dashboards of the yellow-and-green autorickshaws that ply Delhi's chaotic self-regulated traffic.
This is the early stage of Modi's energetic geopolitical campaign, which already this year includes invitations received and accepted to address US Congress from President Joe Biden and to attend Bastille Day celebrations from President Emmanuel Macron — both extremely rare diplomatic honors for foreign dignitaries.
Biden was the first US president to invite Modi on a state visit. Photo: Win McNamee/Getty Images
Most recently, Modi made a stellar turn at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, which coincided with India becoming only the fourth country to achieve a controlled landing on the Moon — days after Russian efforts crashed into the lunar surface. /p>
Western policymakers are keen to sign arms deals with India, help their companies gain access to a growing market and, above all, help the country become a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific region.
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Modi will agree to this if it suits his interests. The centerpiece of his country's approach to international relations since independence in 1947 had been a policy of non-alignment. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India's foreign minister, says the strategy was born out of the young country's determination to assert its autonomy rather than be forced to choose sides during the Cold War.
Long-entrenched habits are difficult to break, and India has refused to even join regional trade groupings. In 2020, she withdrew from negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, an initiative in which she was instrumental in the original attempt to create. This approach may have caused India to lose its weight on the world stage.
However, times have changed, and so has India, says Jaishankar: “Today we are a larger economy, we are a more powerful country. a country with great opportunities and we have more interests. We are more willing, more active and more confident in working with other countries.”
He characterizes the “updated version” of Indian foreign policy as “multilateral rather than non-aligned,” but quickly adds: “The underlying sentiment remains a very strong sense of independence. Countries in the middle must find a middle way.”
This is, of course, easier said than done. In the past, Jaishankar has described his country's foreign policy as a complex pursuit of apparently conflicting goals that comes down to «not just arithmetic, but calculus.» In winning over Modi, the West must also do some difficult things and, for example, ignore India's refusal to unequivocally condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Moscow has long provided economic and military assistance to India and sided with New Delhi when disputes with Pakistan reached the UN Security Council. India also took advantage of the Western economic blockade of Russia to significantly increase purchases of Russian oil from the Urals at reduced prices.
Jaishankar responded to criticism of the arrangement by pointing out that Europe, despite sanctions, still imports six times more energy from Russia than India. He adds that, as a poorer country, it cannot afford to be so picky about its sources of resources.
Historian Sergei Plokhy believes that the West should not worry too much about India's Russophilia. He argues that the war in Ukraine, rather than increasing Moscow's global clout, has accelerated potential subjugation to Beijing. These changing dynamics, as well as the vastly different economic trajectories of Russia and India, are changing New Delhi's calculus, moving it closer to the West as the challenge posed by China threatens to outweigh all other considerations.
Last week, China unveiled the latest version of its national map, which includes the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh (which Beijing insists on calling «Southern Tibet») and the disputed Aksai Chin plateau in Chinese territory. After the inevitable protests from New Delhi, Beijing rather condescendingly suggested that India «remain calm» and refrain from «over-interpretation» of the issue.
Great chance. One of the main sources of disagreement between the two countries is the Line of Actual Control, a disputed and poorly demarcated 3,440 km border in the Himalayas. In 2020, Chinese and Indian troops fought with fists and batons during a violent clash in Ladakh's Galwan Valley. It was the first fatal confrontation between the two sides since 1975 and led to a marked deterioration in relations: India banned TikTok and dozens of other Chinese apps. This summer, authorities imposed restrictions on the import of laptops, 60 percent of which are made in China, citing national security concerns.
A couple of days after the release of the new map (which also angered Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines), Chinese officials said President Xi Jinping would not attend this weekend's summit — the first such meeting he has missed since taking power in China. 2013: Just last month, Xi traveled to Johannesburg for the BRICS summit, which ended with the announcement that the group would be expanded from five members to 11 in an attempt to raise its profile relative to other global groupings.
< img src="/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/f8f4418ae20eac29a9c48d0cc25aa77f.jpg" /> The BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — presented a united front in Johannesburg Photo: GIANLUIGI GUERCIA/POOL/AFP via Getty Images
Thus, Xi Jinping's no-show may be a snub to the G20 as a whole, but it will almost certainly be interpreted as a personal snub to Modi. It is no coincidence that Beijing appears intent on sending the Indian prime minister a message so soon after he was feted by Western leaders, according to international relations experts. The battle over the Dalai Lama's successor also threatens relations between the two countries. India is home to Tibet's spiritual leader, who turned 88 earlier this year after he fled into exile in 1959.
China is also irritated that India has joined the Quad security dialogue, popularly known as the Quad, with Australia, Japan and the United States. This strategic security dialogue falls short of a formal alliance, but it is of great importance to India and is the clearest manifestation of its Western leanings. India has ambitious military plans and wants to strengthen its navy to offset China's increased activity in the Indo-Pacific region.
However, it is considered reasonable that India will not assist the US if a conflict arises in the Taiwan Strait. «The Indian military is capable of defending India, but it is already busy managing the borders with Pakistan and China,» says Dr Manoj Joshi of the Observer Research Foundation, a think tank based in New Delhi. “People are mistaken if they think that the Indian military can play a non-regional role.”
But foreign policy experts say Washington views New Delhi more as a potential economic counterweight to Beijing than as a military stronghold. While India remains poor in per capita income, its size and growth potential mean it is the only alternative economic powerhouse in Asia that has any chance of rivaling China.
A recent IMF report projects India's contribution this year to be just over 15 percent of global growth, second only to China's 35 percent and more than the entire Western Hemisphere's 14 percent. But if anything, these bare statistics understate India's importance.
India's GDP is growing rapidly relative to the rest of the world
China is a net exporter, producing most of what it needs and buying little from others. or else. India, by contrast, is a net importer, meaning it will become a critical growth engine for the rest of the world as its own economy moves forward.
This discrepancy also helps explain why India and China are unlikely to achieve complete détente anytime soon. Trade between the two countries is important, but one-sided. India's trade deficit with China topped $100bn (£80bn) earlier this year, a fact that ministers have long described as an «issue of concern».
If India's rivalry with China intensifies, India may find it increasingly uncomfortable to sit on the geopolitical fence. It is likely that the country will also face questions about human rights abuses and democratic backsliding within the country. According to the World Bank, Freedom House, a US think tank, now rates India as an «illiberal democracy» and only «partly free», while «rule of law» measures have also weakened.
When Macron invited Modi to attend this year's Bastille Day celebrations, Le Monde newspaper called it a «miscalculation.» The French national holiday celebrates freedom, equality, fraternity — «all values that have been weakened in India since Hindu nationalists took power in 2014», the newspaper writes. “This contradiction is a reality that France has chosen to ignore.”
Critics see Hindutva, the BJP's guiding philosophy, as a potentially explosive mixture of nationalism and religious majoritarianism. One way to understand its impetus and appeal is to imagine India as divided between those who seek to reverse the effects of one colonization and those who want to reverse two—the British and, before that, the Mughals. Ancient civilizations have long memories.
Many place names in New Delhi's government quarter have recently been rebranded. Rajpath, which used to be Kingsway under the British, is now called Kartavya Path; Murgal Gardens were renamed Amrit Udyan (Garden of Nectar). A US State Department report last year listed violence against religious minorities in several Indian states, including by law enforcement agencies. It also reviewed reports of arrests of Muslims and Christians on charges of forcing others to convert.
In early August, Modi faced a no-confidence vote in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India's parliament (and, thanks to his large majority, was easily defeated) over his handling of the deadly ethnic conflict in the northeastern state. Manipur, where more than 180 people are believed to have died. Human rights activists say the Modi government has taken repressive measures against journalists and activists.
Some Indians are scratching their heads and wondering why Western media and think tanks seem to have become more critical of the Modi administration even as he is being courted by world leaders. The key to the answer lies in the question. India must understand that increased power and influence goes hand in hand with greater scrutiny. “Whenever something negative comes up about India, it is attributed to some Western conspiracy,” says Dr Joshi. “But this is the same West that supports India against China…”
However, Salvatore Babones, associate professor of sociology at the University of Sydney, argues that Western views of Modi are largely shaped by the small number of English-speaking opinion-makers in India. Overall, these cadres find the Prime Minister unlikable, comparing him to Donald Trump and accusing him of preaching anti-elitism while cozying up to billionaire industrialists. They are at odds with the majority of Indians, who believe Modi has brought some political stability to a country where constant horse trading and balancing of interests have historically produced very little substantive results.
As of February this year, Modi's personal approval rating was 78 percent. Photo: Prakash Singh/Bloomberg
Earlier this year, the BJP suffered an election defeat in Karnataka, its only stronghold in the south. Rahul Gandhi, a leading opposition politician, was found guilty of false defamation charges. But his two-year prison sentence was suspended by the Supreme Court in early August, allowing him to return as an MP and stand in next year's general election. The court has also launched an investigation into whether the Manipur police were conspiring to cause violence in the state. All of these developments were a setback for the government, but also suggest that democratic checks and balances are generally maintained.
The Indian Constitution, ratified in 1949, sets out a long «list» of different castes and tribes who are entitled to a certain percentage of government jobs. Over the years, this positive discrimination has created resentment among middle caste Hindus who do not belong to any tribal or religious minority and believe that the constitution contains something for everyone except them. Indian policymakers inevitably struggle to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are distributed evenly across a population that now numbers about 1.4 billion. This led to the majority at times feeling and voting like a minority.
Modi tapped into these sentiments, touching the passions and fears of hundreds of millions of people who felt they had been largely ignored by previous administrations, and awakening strong feelings of patriotism. As of February of this year, his personal approval rating was 78%, according to Morning Consult, which is high for a leader who has been in the job for nearly a decade.
The existential questions India faces embrace the human condition more generally. Will the country's cauldron of diversity and mishmash of identities create chaos or build strength? Which is better: the security system of social democracy or the dynamism of unbridled capitalism? Is inequality harmful to social cohesion or does it promote entrepreneurship?
Does the rule of law hinder rapid development or is it vital to becoming a key cog in the knowledge economy? Can only a political leader hold the nation-state together amid the tensions created by globalization and de-globalization?
This is a defining moment not only for India but for the world. Political theorist Sunil Khilnani has described India's history since independence as «the third moment of the great democratic experiment begun in the late 18th century by the American and French revolutions.»
While the Indian experiment is the youngest, Khilnani argues, «its results may well prove to be the most significant of all», partly because of its human scale and partly because of its location: «An essential springboard of the seething freedom of the Asian continent.» ”
India Series – The Journey Forward [Article 2]
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